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Ill-Gotten Gains: The Case for 
International Corporate Criminal 
Liability 
Jordan Sundell* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although many corporations act responsibly, economically 
fragile countries and war zones have proved fertile ground for a 
number of multinational corporations to commit a variety of 
serious international crimes. In such cases the offending 
corporation all too often goes under-punished or escapes 
punishment altogether.  Take for example Nigeria.  In 1995 the 
Nigerian government, in response to pressure from Royal 
Dutch Shell to repress environmental protestors, executed nine 
indigenous tribal leaders, including the well-known writer and 
human rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, 1  on suspect murder 
charges.2 Royal Dutch Shell eventually settled the claim in U.S. 
federal court for $15.5 million, less than two-tenths of one 
percent of the profits the company made from the region in the 
more than thirty years it operated there.3 Across the world, on 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2006, 
University of Wisconsin. The author would like to thank his wife for her love 
and support, Professors Weissbrodt and Ní Aoláin for their comments, and all 
of the members of the Minnesota Journal of International Law for their 
contributions. 
 1. See Ed Pilkington, Shell Pays Out $15.5m Over Saro-Wiwa Killing, 
GUARDIAN, June 9, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/08/nigeria
-usa. For his work organizing indigenous peoples and minorities into a 
peaceful movement, Ken Saro-Wiwa was awarded the Goldman 
Environmental Prize as well as the Right Livelihood Award. See Recipients by 
Year, THE GOLDMAN ENVIRONMENTAL PRIZE, http://www.goldmanprize.org/re
cipients/year (last visited Sept. 4, 2010); List of Right Livelihood Award 
Laureates, THE RIGHT LIVELIHOOD AWARD, http://www.rightlivelihood.org/lau
reates.html?&no_cache=1 (last visited Sept. 4, 2010). 
 2. See Pilkington, supra note 1. 
 3. See JOHN MADELEY, BIG BUSINESS, POOR PEOPLES: THE IMPACT OF 
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS ON THE WORLD’S POOR, 123 (1999) (More 
than $30 billion in oil was removed from Ogoniland between 1960 and 1994); 
Ken Saro-
Wiwa, THE RIGHT LIVELIHOOD AWARD, http://www.rightlivelihood.org/saro-wi
SUNDELL - Final 5/6/2011 12:12 PM 
2011] THE CASE FOR INT’L CORPORATE LIABILITY 649 
 
the war-ridden streets of Iraq in September 2007, a 
Blackwater 4  convoy fired on a group of civilians in Nisour 
Square, leaving seventeen dead.5 A trial failed to convict the 
guards as a result of evidentiary and immunity complications.6  
Nor is corporate malfeasance a new phenomenon. In the 
1950s the United Fruit Company, a U.S. corporation with a 
virtual monopoly in Guatemala, overthrew a democratically 
elected government there with the help of the CIA.7 Likewise, 
some of the earliest multinational corporations such as the 
British and Dutch East India Companies meddled with local 
governments and exploited human and natural resources.8  
Herein resides the issue. Until recently, international 
criminal law has largely ignored the actions of corporations. At 
the same time, corporations have grown into organizations of 
herculean proportions with far flung subsidiaries and contacts 
that span the globe. In conjunction with that expansion, certain 
corporations have committed grave abuses in the developing 
world that would be impermissible in the developed world. Nor 
does this trend seem likely to recede absent changes in the 
 
wa.html (Royal Dutch Shell enjoyed a 30% share of the oil profits made off the 
region). See also Press Release, Center for Constitutional Rights, Settlement 
Reached in Human Rights Cases Against Royal Dutch/Shell (June 8, 2009) 
http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/settlement-reached-human-right
s-cases-against-royal-dutch/shell (last visited Nov. 14, 2010) (While the 
settlement only resolved the claims of the individual plaintiffs, a portion of the 
settlement will be dedicated to initiatives to support the Ogoni people). 
 4. Blackwater Worldwide, now called Xe Services, is a private security 
force that was used heavily by the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan 
before the massacre. See Blackwater Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2011, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/blackwater_usa/index.
html. 
 5. See James Risen, Efforts to Prosecute Blackwater are Collapsing, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/21/
world/21contractors.html?_r=2&hp. 
 6. See id. at A2 (explaining that there is uncertainty whether 
Blackwater, under a contract from the Department of State, is subject to the 
same criminal liability as Department of Defense contractors are and that 
following the shootings, government investigators gave the Blackwater 
personnel immunity in exchange for information). 
 7. See generally STEPHEN SCHLESINGER & STEPHEN KINZER, BITTER 
FRUIT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE AMERICAN COUP IN GUATEMALA 153, 159 
(1982) (chronicling the role of United Fruit Company in the overthrow of the 
Guatemalan government). 
 8. See CLIVE DAY, A HISTORY OF COMMERCE 200 (1907). See, e.g., Teemu 
Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law and 
Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1599, 1677 
(2000) (calling the British East India Company "one of the most notorious 
corporations of all time."). 
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status quo. 
Given multinational corporations’ reach and ability to act 
irresponsibly in the developing world more or less with 
impunity, this Note proposes that the international community 
should either extend the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) to legal persons or adopt a specialized 
international tribunal empowered to try corporations for their 
role in egregious human rights abuse. Part I of this Note will 
review the history of corporate responsibility in international 
law, discuss the main approaches to handling corporate 
criminality, and address the relative strengths and weaknesses 
of domestic courts and international tribunals in the context of 
corporate criminal liability. Part II will respond to the main 
critiques of corporate criminal liability, evaluate the efficacy of 
domestic legal systems’ reactions to corporate criminality, and 
suggest that domestic courts utilizing civil liability should 
adjudicate lesser offenses while international courts applying 
criminal sanctions should, subject to complementarity, resolve 
serious offenses.9 Finally, Part III concludes with suggestions 
on how to amend the ICC or fashion a special international 
tribunal to increase the international accountability of 
corporations.  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. A BRIEF TOUR OF THE POST-WORLD WAR II LANDSCAPE 
Prior to World War II (WWII), international law, 
constrained states rather than individuals.10 The Nuremburg 
trials transformed this proposition by finding individuals 
accountable for violating human rights. 11  Subsequent trials, 
 
 9. The line demarking lesser offenses from serious offenses remains open 
to debate. A potential resolution may lie in utilizing the ICC’s rubric of 
limiting serious offenses to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
genocide. An additional category of gross environmental violations might also 
be important to curbing the worst multinational actors. 
 10. See ALICE BULLARD, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRISIS 39, 51 (2008). Compare 
id. (“World War II is recognized as the critical moment in global consciousness 
and consensus regarding the human cost of warfare. The conclusion of the war 
stimulated the growth of human rights law, and the emergence of a global 
human rights regime.”) with Eric A. Posner, Political Trials in Domestic and 
International Law, 55 DUKE L.J. 75, 135 (2005) (writing that “the Nuremberg 
trial helped extend international law beyond its traditional application to 
states and into the realm of human rights.”). 
 11. Kyle Rex Jacobson, Doing Business with the Devil: The Challenges of 
Prosecuting Corporate Officials Whose Business Transactions Facilitate War 
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referred to generally as the “industrialist cases,” found that 
German citizens, primarily wealthy industrialists, were guilty 
of committing war crimes.12 One of these war crimes, termed 
“aggressive war,” is based on the theory that these individuals 
had encouraged Germany to make war in order to secure 
economic gain through military investments in industry.13 All 
those charged with this specific war crime were later acquitted 
on the belief that their actions were not covered by the 
Nuremberg Charter and that “active participation in the 
armament of Germany did not suffice to render an individual 
guilty of aggressive war.” 14  Other businessmen were found 
guilty and were sentenced with prison—and death by hanging 
in some cases—for engaging in property crimes, slave labor, 
and as accessories to war crimes. 15  Indeed, the tribunals 
explicitly rejected the argument that private individuals could 
not be charged with war crimes or crimes against humanity.16 
In addition to directly prosecuting corporate leaders for crimes 
committed in an individual capacity, the Nuremburg trials also 
opened up another avenue for charging corporations with 
human rights violations: complicit liability such as aiding and 
abetting. 17  Since the Nuremburg trials, the Genocide 
 
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 56 A.F.L. REV. 167, 170 (2005).  
 12. See Allison Marston Danner, The Nuremberg Industrialist 
Prosecutions and Aggressive War, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 651, 653 (2006). 
 13. See id. 
 14. See id. at 657–58. See also United States v. Flick (The Flick Case), in 
6 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW 10, at 1192 (1952). 
 15. See, e.g., Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others (The Zyklon B Case), 1 
U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM'N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 93, 
101 (1947) (Brit. Mil. Ct. 1946) (convicting Bruno Tesch of distributing the 
poison gas, Zyklon B, to concentration camps knowing it would be used to kill 
civilians); United States v. Flick (The Flick Case), in 6 TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL 
COUNCIL LAW 10, at 681, 852, 1186 (1952) (convicting Frederick Flick and 
other members of a mining conglomerate of contributing money to the Nazi 
government with full knowledge of their crimes); United States v. Krauch (The 
I.G. Farben Case), in 7-8 id. at 309 (1942) (convicting thirteen executives of 
I.G. Farben, a chemical corporation, of unlawful deportation and the use of 
slave labor); United States v. Krupp (The Krupp Case), in 9 id. at 467, 667 
(convicting eleven defendants, executives of Krupp Industrial, of exploitation 
and slave labor offenses). 
 16. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6, Aug. 8, 
1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 286; see also The I.G. Farben Case, in 8 TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL 
COUNCIL LAW 10, at 1136 (1942) (“It can no longer be questioned that the 
criminal sanctions of international law are applicable to private individuals.”). 
 17. Richard Herz, Text of Remarks: Corporate Alien Tort Liability and the 
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Convention, the ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) as well as the 
ICC have all recognized that along with individuals, non-state 
actors such as corporations could be held accountable for 
violations of international law.18  
B. FORMS OF CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL 
OFFENSES 
Efforts to remedy corporate wrongdoing have largely 
followed three approaches: civil liability imposed by domestic 
courts, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, 
and soft law. 
i. Civil Liability 
The most prominent codification of civil liability for 
international offenses is the US Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA). 
Starting with the landmark case Filartiga v. Pena-Irala in 
1980, human rights lawyers began to use the ATCA to bring a 
series of lawsuits against foreign human rights violators, 
including corporations, in U.S. federal courts.19 Liability under 
the ATCA attaches when a violation of either “the law of 
nations” or “a treaty of the United States” occurs. 20  The 
Supreme Court has interpreted these terms to extend only to 
offenses that would violate 1789-era international law such as 
piracy, infringement of ambassadorial rights, and violation of 
safe conduct,21 as well as violations of modern international 
norms of comparable definiteness and agreement among 
 
Legacy of Nuremberg, 10 GONZ. J. INT'L L. 76, 77 (2006–2007). For example, in 
Bodner v. Banque Paribas, an action brought under the U.S. Alien Tort 
Statute whereby non-U.S citizens can bring claims against one another for 
violations of the law of nations, the court expressly relied on the Nuremburg 
trials in finding that corporations could be found liable for their complicity in 
human rights violations. See Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117, 
134 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 18. See Gwynne Skinner, Nuremburg’s Legacy Continues: The Nuremburg 
Trials’ Influence on Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts Under the Alien 
Tort Statute, 71 Alb. L. Rev. 321, 340–41 (2008) 
 19. In Filartiga, two Paraguayan citizens employed a then-seldom-used 
1789 statute, the ATCA, to sue a Paraguayan government official for an act of 
torture that took place in Paraguay. The litigation resulted in an award of 
$10.3 million in damages. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 
1980). 
 20. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 21. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714–15 (2004). 
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civilized nations as the 1789-era claims.22 Assuming a plaintiff 
can allege a valid claim, the ATCA covers general corporate 
activity23 and also permits courts to find a parent corporation 
liable for the actions of its subsidiaries under certain 
circumstances.24  
Besides the vagueness of what torts come within the Act’s 
ambit, commentators have highlighted three other drawbacks 
to the ATCA for plaintiffs. First, the majority of jurisdictions 
require a showing that the corporation either acted with state 
aid or in concert with a state actor.25 This prong heightens the 
investigatory demands on plaintiffs and suggests that claims 
lacking a state component may not be justiciable under the 
ATCA. Second, U.S. courts tend not to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over defendants save when “sufficient connections” 
exist between the court and the defendant.26 In the case of 
foreign state defendants, demonstrating sufficient connections 
can be a taxing bar for plaintiffs.27 Third, even if a litigant 
surmounts the first two hurdles, forum non conveniens often 
prevents the claim. 28  In concert, these three features pose 
 
 22. Id. at 732. 
 23. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 891 (C.D. Cal. 1997) 
(concluding that international law may hold private actors like Unocal Corp. 
liable for major violations of international law); Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 
232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that non-state actors can violate the law of 
nations including war crimes and other international criminal offenses). 
 24. See In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 271 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“In some instances, the corporate relationship between a 
parent and its subsidiary [is] sufficiently close as to justify piercing the 
corporate veil and holding one corporation legally accountable for the actions 
of the other.” (alternation in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting 
Thomson-CSF, S.A v. American Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir. 
1995))). 
 25. See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239–40, 245; Wiwa v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 104–05 (2d Cir. 2000). But Tel-Oren v. Libyan 
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791–95 (1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (writing 
that for a handful of private acts, such as piracy and slave trading, the ATCA 
permitted individual liability absent state aid). 
 26. See Developments in the Law—International Criminal Law: Corporate 
Liability for Violations of International Human Rights Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
2025, 2039–40 (2000–2001) [hereinafter Corporate Liability]; Wiwa, 226 F.3d 
88 (noting the various standards to determine whether plaintiffs and 
defendants have sufficient contacts in a state to make them subject to the 
court’s personal jurisdiction definition). 
 27. See generally Corporate Liability at 2040. But see Wiwa, 226 F.3d 88 
(stating the Second Circuit’s reversal of the judgment dismissing claims based 
on the absence of personal jurisdiction over two foreign corporations). 
 28. See, e.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(noting a dismissal of plaintiff’s claims against a U.S firm on grounds that the 
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considerable obstacles to plaintiffs seeking U.S court 
jurisdiction, particularly low-income citizens of developing 
nations. 
ii. United Nations Security Council 
The United Nations (UN) Charter charges the UNSC with 
maintaining international order and security.29 Where a threat 
to peace exists, the UNSC has the authority to adopt non-
military measures such as “complete or partial interruption of 
economic relations . . . .” 30  These sanctions can target the 
business activities of States, individuals, and groups of 
individuals or legal persons.31 For example, in 1993 the UNSC 
placed an embargo on arms and oil in Angola to hinder an 
Angolan military group.32 Similarly, in 2000 it banned diamond 
exports in Sierra Leone.33  
However, UN sanctions suffer from a significant 
shortcoming: indirectness. 34  The UN cannot prosecute 
individuals, groups, or entities that violate a UN-imposed 
embargo.35 As such, member states, rather than the UNSC, 
have the onus of ensuring legal violations do not go 
unpunished.36 Even more important, the UNSC did not act in 
Angola or Sierra Leone to suppress corporate wrongdoing, but 
rather to pressure specific political regimes. 37  Given the 
UNSC’s silence in the face of the Rwandan genocide, 38  the 
 
case should be adjudicated in Ecuador and Peru as more appropriate forums). 
 29. See U.N. Charter art. 39. 
 30. Id. art. 41. 
 31. Régis Bismuth, Mapping a Responsibility of Corporations for 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Sailing Between International 
and Domestic Legal Orders, 38 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 203, 210–11 (2010) 
(discussing the use of economic sanctions on states, individuals and groups of 
individuals or legal persons). 
 32. S.C. Res. 864, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/864 (Sept. 15, 1993). 
 33.  Bismuth, supra note 31, at 210–11 (noting the use of sanctions in the 
diamond conflict in Sierra Leone). 
 34. Id. at 211 (discussing how the UN is unable to directly prosecute 
individuals, groups and persons violating its embargoes). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See S.C. Res. 1306, Preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1306 (July 5, 2000) 
(noting that the purpose of the sanctions was to pressure the government of 
Sierra Leone to establish an effective Certificate of Origin regime in order to 
aid in establishing stability in the region). 
 38. See Michael N. Barnett, The UN Security Council, Indifference, and 
Genocide in Rwanda, 12 Cultural Anthropology 551, 561 (1997) (discussing 
the UNSC’s inaction in the face of suffering in Rwanda).  
SUNDELL - Final 5/6/2011 12:12 PM 
2011] THE CASE FOR INT’L CORPORATE LIABILITY 655 
 
Burmese pipeline tragedy,39 and a variety of other appalling 
behaviors, 40  relying on the UNSC may prove a recipe for 
impunity.  
iii. Soft Law  
A variety of organizations such as the UN and the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) have taken a different approach to corporate 
criminality. Rather than sanctioning activities after the fact, 
these organizations have fashioned a number of soft laws.41 
Though not technically binding or backed by formal 
accountability mechanisms, 42  the international standards 
championed by these soft laws aim to cultivate a body of norms 
that will shape future corporate behavior. 43  In 2003, for 
example, the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights adopted an initiative entitled 
“Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations 
and other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
Rights.” 44  The initiative reaffirmed and fleshed out 
 
 39. In Burma, civilians near a pipeline building project “have [allegedly] 
been subjected to forced labour, rape and even murder by army units working 
for the oil companies to protect the pipelines.” Shirin Wheeler, EU probes 
Burma pipeline abuses, BBC, Oct. 12, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1
596181.stm. The United States has imposed sanctions, id., but the UNSC has 
failed to act. Crackdown in Burma: Targeted Sanctions Needed, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, (Jan. 11, 2008), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/01/11/crack
down-burma-targeted-sanctions-needed. 
 40. See Daniel Nasaw, China and Russia Veto Zimbabwe Sanctions, 
GUARDIAN, July 11, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/11/united
nations.zimbabwe (discussing China and Russia’s blocking of sanctions 
against Zimbabwe). 
 41. For the purposes of this Note, “soft law” means non-binding quasi-
legal agreements such as UN resolutions and codes of conducts furnished by 
relevant international non-governmental organizations. For a fuller discussion 
of soft law see Gregory C. Shaffer and Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: 
Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 
MINN. L. REV. 706 (2010). For more on soft law initiatives geared towards 
corporations see John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The 
Evolving International Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 819, 819–20 (2007).  
 42.  Barnali Choudhury, Beyond the Alien Tort Claims Act: Alternative 
Approaches to Attributing Liability to Corporations for Extraterritorial Abuses, 
26 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 43, 63–66 (2005–2006) (discussing the non-binding 
nature of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises). 
 43.  Bismuth, supra note 31, at 211–12 (discussing the OECD’s attempt at 
using soft law to shape corporate behavior). 
 44. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion 
and Prot. of Human Rights, Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. 
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corporations’ responsibility to respect international commercial 
law, particularly in relation to the rights of workers and the 
security of people.45  
iv. A New Contender: Corporate Criminal Liability 
a. The International Criminal Court 
Another potential conduit for holding corporations liable is 
the ICC. However, in its current form the ICC does not have 
the authority to do so. Under Article 5 of the Rome Statute, the 
ICC has jurisdiction over natural, but not legal persons 46 
committing the “most serious [international] crimes.”47 To date, 
this mandate encompasses genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes.48  
In order for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction one of four 
preconditions must be met: (1) the person accused of 
committing a crime is a national of a state party to the Rome 
Statute,49 (2) the alleged crime was committed in the territory 
of a state party to the Rome Statute,50 (3) the UNSC refers the 
case to the ICC,51 or (4) either the state where the accused is a 
national or the state where the crime was committed accepts 
the jurisdiction of the court.52 To exercise that jurisdiction the 
case must be referred to the Prosecutor by either a state party 
or the UNSC.53 Alternatively, the Prosecutor may also decide to 
unilaterally initiate an investigation, but must go before a pre-
trial chamber to get further authorization if his initial findings 
indicate a reasonable basis for continuing the investigation.54  
 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003). For more information on soft 
laws impact on international behavior see David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, 
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 901 
(2003). 
 45. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 44, at 911–12 (discussing the 
responsibilities corporations have over activities within their influence).  
 46.  See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25, July 
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1002 (1998), available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute] 
(referencing natural persons, but not legal persons). 
 47. Id. art. 5(1). 
 48. Id. art. 5(1)(a–d). 
 49. Id. art. 12(2)(b). 
 50. Id. art. 12(2)(a). 
 51. Id. art. 13(b). 
 52. Rome Statute, supra note 46, art. 12(3).  
 53. Id. art. 13.  
 54. Id. art. 15.  
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In addition to limited territorial jurisdiction, ICC 
jurisdiction has another critical limitation known as 
complementarity, which recognizes the right of states to have 
the first opportunity to prosecute their own nationals.55 Under 
the principle of complementarity, the ICC may act only if a 
state will not or cannot genuinely investigate or prosecute the 
crime at issue.56 Furthermore, the ICC may only act if a crime 
is of sufficient gravity and if the individual has not already 
been tried for the same conduct in another court.57  
b. Domestic Approaches 
While the ICC does not hold corporations criminally liable, 
a growing number of countries employ various forms of 
corporate criminal liability in their domestic law, such as The 
Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Switzerland and France. 58 
Some countries, for instance France, generally restrict liability 
to high ranking officials and their agents.59 Others, like the 
United States, permit holding corporations criminally liable for 
the actions of each employee as well as the cumulative acts of 
its employees. 60  For example, a US federal prosecutor can 
charge a corporation with a crime if any employee, not just a 
high-ranking employee,61 commits an offense.62 Furthermore, if 
multiple individuals within the corporation possess the 
elements of criminal wrongdoing, a court may attribute their 
aggregate knowledge to the corporation.63 Under the aggregate 
knowledge test, even if a court could not find any single 
employee liable, it could find the corporation liable. 
Importantly, the US criminal liability regime also allows a 
 
 55. Kari M. Fletcher, Defining the Crime of Aggression: Is There an 
Answer to the International Criminal Court’s Dilemma?, 65 A.F.L. REV. 229, 
246 (2010).  
 56. Rome Statute, supra note 46, art. 17(a–b).  
 57. Id. art. 17(1)(c–d). 
 58. Sara Sun Beale & Adam G. Safwat, What Developments in Western 
Europe Tell Us About American Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability, 8 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 89, 110–15 (2004).  
 59. Id. at 117.  
 60. Being able to impute the cumulative acts of the corporation’s 
employees is particularly important in cases where no one employee has done 
enough to incur liability. 
 61. United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 660 
(2d Cir. 1989). 
 62. United States v. Sain, 141 F.3d 463, 475–76 (3rd Cir. 1998). 
 63. United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st. 
Cir. 1987). 
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court to extend liability from the immediate corporation to 
controlling parent corporations 64  or de facto successor 
corporations if necessary.65 
In general, a corporation may be criminally responsible 
under US corporate criminal liability for the illegal acts of its 
employees provided that such acts are: (1) connected to and 
done within the course of employment, (2) for the benefit of the 
corporation, and (3) with the authorization or acquiescence of 
the corporation. 66  In assessing a corporation’s culpability, a 
judge must consider four aggravating factors and two 
mitigating factors. The aggravating factors include (1) the 
involvement in or tolerance of criminal activity by “high level” 
or “substantial authority” personnel, (2) a recent history of 
similar misconduct on the organization’s part, (3) a violation of 
a judicial order or condition of probation, and (4) whether the 
corporation tried to obstruct justice. 67  Mitigating factors 
include (1) the presence of “an effective program to prevent and 
detect violations of law” by corporate agents and (2) the extent 
of the corporation’s cooperation with law enforcement 
officials.68  
At sentencing, a judge has a number of sanctions at his or 
her disposal. The most common penalty is fines.69 However, 
judges can also deprive the corporation of the gains it received 
as a result of its illegal activities,70 suspend the corporation’s 
operations for a period of time, dissolve the corporation 
altogether (i.e., a corporate death sentence), or order the 
corporation to pay for negative publicity (e.g., tobacco 
companies in the United States have to pay for anti-smoking 
advertisements).71 Finally, a judge may try to rehabilitate the 
corporation.72 As a matter of practice, the main sanctions tend 
 
 64. Massachusetts v. Beneficial Finance Co., 275 N.E.2d 33, 91–92 (Mass. 
1971).  
 65. United States v. Shields Rubber Corp., 732 F. Supp 569, 571–72 
(W.D.Pa. 1989). 
 66. 10 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 4942 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2009).. 
 67. Jennifer Moore, Corporate Culpability under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 743, 784 (1992).  
 68. Id. 
 69. ANCA IULIA POP, CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS- 
COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE 39 (2006) available at 
http://www.law.msu.edu/king/2006/2006_Pop.pdf. 
 70. Id. at 40. 
 71. Id. at 4, 39. 
 72. Traditionally, this occurs through one of two forms: by placing the 
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to be fines, restitution, remedial orders, community service, 
and probation.73 
C. BODIES OF JUSTICE: PROS AND CONS OF DOMESTIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
Assuming the international community prefers a legal 
solution over an ad hoc process involving the UNSC, two likely 
approaches exist for handling major human rights abuses: 
domestic proceedings (whether civil or administrative) and 
international tribunals. 74  Which forum handles a corporate 
abuse case can have profound implications for the corporation, 
the victims, and the local government.  
i. Domestic Trials 
Prosecuting corporate offenders in domestic courts has 
three primary benefits. First, domestic trials can burnish the 
political legitimacy of a regime, particularly a new regime, at 
the local, national, and international level.75  For developing 
nations especially, prosecuting violations simultaneously 
demonstrates the regime’s capacity and respect for human 
rights.76 Greater capacity and respect for the rule of law can 
favorably demark a new government from an old regime. 77 
Second, domestic prosecution builds up the local legal system 
by establishing local courts and police forces as fair and 
 
corporation on probation or by ordering it to reorganize. Id. at 38–39. 
 73. Id. at 38–44. 
 74.  See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving 
Justice: The Need for Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1996) 
(arguing that the international community has a moral obligation to seek 
justice following human rights abuses, whether by international or domestic 
mechanisms); Christopher C. Joyner, Redressing Impunity for Human Rights 
Violations: The Universal Declaration and the Search for Accountability, 26 
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 591 (1998) (highlighting the importance of victim 
redress for human rights violations and deploring the prevalence of impunity 
for violators); Neil J. Kritz, Coming To Terms with Atrocities: A Review of 
Accountability Mechanisms For Mass Violations of Human Rights, 59 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 127 (1996) (explaining that the appropriate response to 
human rights abuses will depend on the specific circumstances and should 
take into account the needs of the victims). 
 75. Kritz, supra note 74, at 132. 
 76. See id. at 132–33 (noting that trials demonstrate the new regimes 
determination to hold individuals accountable as well as the capacity to 
actually do so through a rebuilt legal system). 
 77. See id. (noting that trials of serious claims like war crimes garner 
considerable international attention and show the new government’s resolve 
for holding perpetrators accountable). 
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effective.78 Last, domestic prosecutions provide catharsis. That 
is, the prosecution acknowledges the wrongs of the past while 
promising hope for a better future, free of human rights 
violations.79  
At the same time, domestic trials, especially in the 
developing world, have several weaknesses. Procedural 
irregularities, political pressure, and lingering societal strife 
can color domestic adjudications.80 This coloring can cut both 
ways. Inadequate procedural safeguards such as a lack of 
transparency provide an environment conducive to 
corruption. 81  That kind of environment in turn provides 
corporations with numerous opportunities to influence the 
proceedings. On the other hand, local political sentiment may 
permit states to victimize corporations through unfair, 
politicized laws.82 Along with procedural and political problems, 
domestic courts also face major jurisdictional restraints.83 In 
most cases, domestic courts can only impose jurisdiction when 
the person or the crime is linked to the state the court resides 
in.84 
ii. International Tribunals 
Besides domestic proceedings, the other major method 
available for resolving international corporate human rights 
abuse is international tribunals. The international nature of 
these tribunals is their greatest advantage. The global backing 
inherent in an international forum “convey[s] a clear message 
that the international community will not tolerate such 
 
 78. See id. at 133 (noting that such trials “provide an important focus for 
rebuilding the domestic judiciary and criminal justice system” and establish 
“local courts as a credible forum for the redress of grievances in a nonviolent 
manner.”). 
 79.  Milena Sterio, Rethinking Amnesty, 34 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 373, 
375 (2006). 
 80. See Kritz, supra note 74, at 136–39 (citing Bosnia as illustrative of the 
difficulties incumbent in politically and ethnically divided societies). 
 81. See Sterio, supra note 79, at 376 (noting that in this type of 
environment judges may be biased due to corruption). 
 82. For example, in August 1960, Cuba issued an executive resolution 
expropriating all property and enterprises wholly or principally owned by 
American nationals. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 403 
(1964). More recently, Bolivia and Venezuela have nationalized much of their 
oil industries, expropriating the property of companies like ConocoPhillips, 
Chevron, Exxon Mobil, BP, and Total. Venezuela Takes Over Refineries, BBC 
NEWS (May 2, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6610333.stm. 
 83. Sterio, supra note 79, at 376. 
 84. Id. 
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atrocities . . . .” 85  In addition to signaling the international 
community’s resolve, application of international law 
eliminates the potentially unfair use of politically-driven 
domestic laws while advancing the legitimacy of international 
human rights standards. Finally, an international body can 
often avoid procedural issues relating to jurisdiction and access 
to evidence that frequently hinder domestic courts.86 Likewise, 
a tribunal’s global reputation might secure cooperation from 
third parties and theoretically “neutral” governments that a 
domestic tribunal would not receive.87  
For all of their benefits, international judicial bodies have 
some serious drawbacks. First, international judges and 
prosecutors may ignore, or, at least, undervalue a country’s 
political situation.88 For example, during its first two years of 
operation in Rwanda the ICTR at times barred its staff from 
any contact with Rwandan authorities, even those who 
possessed useful information; did not make contact with 
victim’s groups, which could have provided a wealth of evidence 
and information; and generally kept itself at arm’s length from 
the country.89 That distance left the impression that Rwanda’s 
wounds were “completely irrelevant to tribunal officials.” 90 
Second, international prosecutions may only have a muted 
impact within the country of the human rights violation.91 The 
proceedings generally take place in a foreign tongue in a 
courtroom far from both the place of the crime and the people 
most directly affected by the prosecution.92 This often causes 
local populations to see the tribunal decisions as the product of 
“occidental bias and victor’s justice” rather than as a fair and 
 
 85. Kritz, supra note 74, at 129. 
 86. See id. at 129–30 (noting that personal jurisdiction and access to 
evidence issues are often more easily solved by an international court whose 
statute was specifically designed to deal with these kinds of situations).  
 87. See id. For example, often potential defendants are not accessible or 
have long since vacated the territory where the atrocities were committed; 
thus, “an international tribunal stands a greater chance than local courts of 
obtaining their physical custody and extradition.” Id. at 129. 
 88. See id. at 145–46 (highlighting the disconnect between the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the country of Rwanda 
itself).  
 89. Id. at 146. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. at 132–33. 
 92. Id. at 130–31 (explaining the reasons why the ICTY and ICTR did not 
sit within Yugoslavia and Rwanda respectively). 
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impartial determination. 93  Third, a number of hybrid 
international fora like the ICTY and ICTR do not possess 
automatic enforcement mechanisms.94  As such, these bodies 
rely on state cooperation to give effect to their judgments.95  
In summary, three main potential mechanisms exist for 
combating international corporate human rights abuse: the 
UNSC and other state-to-state relations, domestic courts, and 
international tribunals. For the latter two options, two types of 
liability exist: criminal and civil. As discussed above, each of 
these approaches has pros and cons. In light of these strengths 
and weaknesses, this Note turns to a comparison of the options 
and makes some recommendations.  
II. ANALYSIS 
A. COMPARING THE CONTENDERS 
i. UN Security Council and Soft Law are (Small) Parts of the 
Solution 
Despite the inconsistent enforcement of UNSC resolutions, 
and the non-binding nature of soft laws, the two mechanisms 
nevertheless play a normative role in altering future behavior. 
According to Harold Hongju Koh, international human rights 
law develops through a process in which norms and rules are 
generated, internalized, and, ultimately, adopted as the new 
rules governing international conduct.96 Following this line of 
reasoning, UNSC resolutions and soft laws, combined with 
efforts to reduce the immediate problem, provide norm-
generating guidance for future actors. That is, they provide 
normative guidance about how actors ought to behave. Over 
time, these normative appeals seep into an international actor’s 
decisions and eventually guide that actor’s behavior, whether 
consciously or not. 
However, norm generation does little in the present to hold 
corporations responsible or to provide victims a sense of justice. 
Take for example Burma. In order to clear land designated for 
 
 93. Sterio, supra note 79, at 378. 
 94. Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, Image and Reality of War Crimes Justice: 
External Perceptions of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 26 
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. (FALL) 21, 23 (2002). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Harold Hongju Koh, How is International Human Rights Law 
Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397, 1407 (1998). 
SUNDELL - Final 5/6/2011 12:12 PM 
2011] THE CASE FOR INT’L CORPORATE LIABILITY 663 
 
a pipeline, Burmese agents used rape, torture, and murder to 
relocate people that refused to leave their homes.97 However, 
the country’s leadership has thus far escaped formal 
approbation from the UNSC. 98  Indeed, China has taken a 
leading role in protecting Burma from repercussions. 99 
Zimbabwe, too, has sidestepped sanctions despite its atrocious 
human rights record.100 Something beyond waiting for norms to 
slowly coalesce should be done. 
ii. Stacking Them Up: Civil Liability vs. Criminal Liability 
Going beyond generating norms, civil liability offers 
victims concrete opportunities to redress the harm visited upon 
them by corporations violating human rights. However, 
although civil liability has some significant advantages, it also 
suffers from serious shortcomings that do not arise with 
criminal liability. These shortcomings suggest an opportunity 
for criminal liability to become an important arrow in the 
international system’s quiver to combat corporate malfeasance.  
Prime among civil liability’s advantages is its ubiquity. 
Almost every jurisdiction (if not all) have laws imposing civil 
liability.101 As such, corporations theoretically face the risk of 
litigation throughout the globe. Similarly, civil liability covers 
more actors than criminal liability. That is, civil liability 
applies to both natural and legal persons, while criminal law 
tends to focus on natural persons and often limits the liability 
of legal persons.102 Likewise, civil liability generally requires a 
lower burden of proof than criminal liability.103 For example, in 
the United States criminal liability requires proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt104 whereas civil liability only necessitates a 
 
 97. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc 
granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), appeal dismissed and district court 
opinion vacated, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 98. Edith M. Lederer, China, Russia Veto Myanmar Resolution, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 14, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2
007/01/13/AR2007011300296.html. 
 99. Colum Lynch, U.S. Push for Burmese War Crimes Probe Hits Chinese 
Wall, FOREIGN POL’Y BLOG (Oct. 24, 2010, 12:34 PM), http://turtlebay.foreignp
olicy.com/posts/2010/10/24/us_push_for_burmese_war_crimes_probe_hits_chin
ese_wall. 
 100. Nasaw, supra note 40.  
 101. 3 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, CORPORATE COMPLICITY & LEGAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 10 (2008), available at http://icj.org/IMG/Volume_3.pdf. 
 102. Id. at 4–6. 
 103. Id.  
 104. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (requiring the government to prove 
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preponderance of the evidence. 105  That lower burden 
theoretically makes it easier for plaintiffs to successfully 
prosecute their claim. Finally, civil liability provides an 
independent source of recompense that victims can pursue 
regardless of how the victim’s government handles the 
situation. 106  Conversely, criminal proceedings depend on 
government action since the prosecutor typically has the last 
word on whether a prosecution will go forward. 
Benefits aside, civil liability possesses some serious flaws. 
First, civil liability tends to be time restricted. Since victims of 
human rights violations often take a long time to organize and 
act against a violator, time is an integral component of holding 
human rights violators responsible. 107  Second, civil liability 
faces jurisdictional restraints. For instance, it can be difficult if 
not impossible to sue a corporation for an offense in State Y if 
the crime happened in State X against a person from State 
X.108 At first glance it may seem right that if a corporation 
harms a citizen of one state in that citizen’s state, civil suits 
should go forward in that state. However, this can raise 
problems, particularly in certain developing countries and 
quasi-states where legal mechanisms are non-existent, 
inadequate, or corrupt. Third, the elements of civil liability, 
principally negligence, intentionality, and causation, may not 
translate well to grave international crimes.109  Fourth, civil 
liability makes for an unpredictable process due to the 
difficulty of calculating which set of laws applies in all but the 
most straightforward cases. Take for instance a case in which a 
crime occurred in State W against a person from State X by a 
citizen of State Z who was acting as an agent of a corporation 
based in State Y. Some states would apply the law of the 
country where the harm occurred while other states would use 
the law of the corporation’s home country or the victim’s home 
country for various other plausible reasons.110 This uncertainty 
 
every essential element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt); see, 
e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000). 
 105. See, e.g., Dunlop v. Daigle, 444 A.2d 519, 520 (N.H. 1982) (“In a civil 
action the burden of proof is generally on the plaintiff to establish its case by a 
preponderance of the evidence.”) (citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 339 (E. 
Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972)). 
 106. INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 101, at 4–6. 
 107. See id. at 44–45. 
 108. See id. at 49–51. 
 109. Id. at 13, 21. 
 110. Id. at 51–53; see also Eric Mongelard, Corporate Civil Liability for 
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raises litigation costs by guaranteeing a legal battle over which 
state’s law to apply. Fifth, civil liability fails to adequately 
capture the gravity of war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and genocide. No matter how high the monetary fine, to label a 
crime “non-criminal” lessens the stigma and seriousness of the 
crime.111 Indeed, a financial judgment may suggest little more 
than that a corporation did something questionable and elected 
to pay to make the problem go away. Finally, the civil system is 
less well equipped than criminal systems to handle major 
international crimes perpetrated by corporations because of 
their ponderous mechanisms for investigation and evidence 
collection.112  
An international criminal law approach, in contrast, would 
remedy the gaps in civil liability. War crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and genocide do not have a statute of limitations.113 
An international approach would likely surmount at least some 
of the jurisdiction issues that any lone domestic legal system 
would face. A criminal law approach applying commonly-agreed 
upon laws would mitigate the choice of law challenges common 
to civil litigation. Moreover, labeling an activity as criminal 
rather civil conveys the gravity of wrongdoing and heightens 
the stigma of the activity. Last, unlike a private civil attorney, 
a criminal prosecutor has significantly more tools and the 
backing of a state to aid him in investigating crime and 
collecting evidence. This would have a two-fold benefit. It would 
ameliorate at least some of the difficulties inherent in trying to 
uncover evidence that offenders can easily destroy or suppress 
in the kinds of places human rights violations abound. It would 
also put an attorney on more even footing with an offending 
corporation. That is, whereas civil attorneys take on 
multinational corporations with little more than the resources 
of his or her firm, a criminal prosecutor would have the 
authority and resources of his state. 
In addition to the advantages highlighted above, corporate 
criminal liability has several other availing qualities. Criminal 
 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 88 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 665, 
687 (2006). 
 111. Mordechai Kremnitzer, A Possible Case for Imposing Criminal 
Liability on Corporations in International Criminal Law, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 909, 915 (2010). 
 112. Id. at 916.  
 113. Rome Statute, supra note 46, art. 29. Still, even without a statute of 
limitations, in practice seeking a conviction for events in the distant past may 
be difficult. 
SUNDELL - Final 5/6/2011 12:12 PM 
666 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW [Vol 20:2 
 
proceedings carry a powerful educational message.114 They also 
provide a better guarantee for victims who often are poor, 
perhaps illiterate, and typically disenfranchised.115 These are 
the kind of people that may need outside help like a 
government prosecutor to get justice since they do not generally 
have the awareness or money to hire a civil attorney. 
Furthermore, criminal corporate liability creates strong 
incentives in favor of compliance. Linking corporate compliance 
with sensible guidelines results in corporations that exercise 
care to prevent and deter criminal conduct. They also promote 
an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and 
lawful behavior.116 Corporate criminality improves the chances 
of uncovering the guilty party (or parties). Frequently an 
outside investigator, whether due to the size of the corporation 
or efforts by the corporation to hide information, cannot find 
the responsible person(s) whereas the corporation can. 117 
Additionally, “[because] of the diffusion of responsibility in 
organizations and the ways in which individual decisions are 
channeled by corporate rules, policies and structures,” in rare 
circumstances no individual or group of individuals may in fact 
deserve blame for the crime.118 In such case, it makes sense to 
blame the corporation rather than its agents for the crime. 
Finally, corporate culture can cultivate the root cause of an 
employee’s criminal activity.119 For example, if the corporation 
provides large financial incentives for getting quick results and 
has a history of turning a blind eye to criminal indiscretions, 
then it arguably played a key role in encouraging illegal 
activity. 
iii. Criticisms of Corporate Criminal Liability 
As noted above, criminal liability possesses a number of 
benefits in the international corporate criminal context. 
However, not everyone supports corporate criminal liability 
(international or otherwise). These critics have raised a variety 
 
 114. Kremnitzer, supra note 111.  
 115. See id. 
 116. Cf. Rebecca Walker, The Evolution of the Law of Corporate 
Compliance in the United States: A Brief Overview, 1731 PLI/CORP 15, 24 
(2009) (listing the existence and adequacy of a pre-existing compliance 
program as a possible consideration when prosecutors are determining when 
to charge a corporation with criminal misconduct).  
 117. Moore, supra note 67, at 754.  
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 753.  
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of objections to the practice ranging from philosophical to 
practical. As discussed below, however, the force behind these 
concerns is greatly diminished when considered within an 
international context.  
The first objection comes from philosophical-minded 
detractors who argue that corporations cannot have the 
required mens rea for criminal liability. While individuals have 
the capacity to know right from wrong, corporations lack that 
capacity and therefore cannot be criminally liable.120 On the 
other hand, proponents of holding corporations criminally liable 
would argue that the corporate structure resembles that of a 
human being. They have brains (the board of directors) as well 
as hands and feet (agents). Therefore, when corporations have 
the requisite criminal state of mind and act on it, corporations 
should suffer the fruit of its illegality. In essence, if 
corporations want to enjoy the benefits of legal personhood, 
they should incur the same consequences as natural persons.  
Other critics contend that criminal liability would actually 
protect individuals within the corporation, making it harder to 
achieve convictions.121 They argue that prosecutors will focus 
on the big prize, the corporation rather than individuals,122 and 
that, in turn, a corporation may seek to protect a guilty 
employee in order to protect itself from criminal sanctions 
stemming from its agent’s activities.123 However, this already 
occurs within civil litigation. Civil attorneys focus on the 
deepest pockets connected to their litigation. Usually that will 
be the corporation. As such, at risk corporations already have 
significant incentives to protect the guilty party in order to 
minimize its own risks. 124  Likewise, a number of countries 
already possess domestic corporate criminal liability. 125 
Imposing criminal liability at the international level would not 
result in increased impunity for guilty corporate officials. 
 
 120. H.J. Hirsch, La Criminalisation Du Comportement Collectif-
Allemagne, in LA CRIMINALISATION DU COMPORTAMENT COLLECTIF: CRIMINAL 
LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS 31, 39 (H. de Doelder & Klaus Tiedemann eds., 
Kluwer Int’l, 1996). 
 121. DiMento et al., Corporate Criminal Liability: A Bibliography, 28 W. 
ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000−01). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. For example, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a corporation 
may be held liable for the acts of its agents 10 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET 
AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 4877 (perm. ed., 
rev. vol. 2009).  
 125. See supra Section I.B.4.b. 
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Indeed, it would lead to greater accountability since states 
would have greater incentive as well as political cover126 to 
investigate and prosecute corporations and their officials than 
they do currently. 
Another argument made by opponents of corporate 
criminal liability is that the primary gain of criminal liability, 
deterrence through the public condemnation and shaming of 
the guilty, does not apply to corporations since people, not 
corporations feel remorse.127  Given this fact, it makes little 
sense to introduce the higher burden of proof and less flexible 
court proceedings that come with criminal liability. However, 
public shaming affects a corporation where it cares the most: 
its share price and bottom line.128 A corporation that engaged 
in behavior that led to criminal sanctions and the resulting 
penalties and bad press would likely find its stock value 
reduced. 129  Since corporate board members are beholden to 
shareholders and often receive stock options as remuneration, 
they presumably have plenty of reasons to avoid criminal 
activities.130  
Critics also contend that imputing culpability would 
routinely fail to distinguish between official and unofficial 
acts.131 These critics worry about holding a corporation liable 
 
 126. That is, international law would give domestic actors a legitimate 
excuse to act on the grounds that if the state does not act the international 
tribunal will. In such a scenario, domestic leaders can reasonably argue that it 
is better for the state to investigate and pursue legitimate claims than to 
ignore the case and trust the international tribunal to handle the case. 
 127. V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purposes Does It 
Serve? 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1495. 
 128. Unethical behavior, if discovered, hurts a business’ profitability in a 
number of ways. Unethical behavior may lead to fines and lawsuits as well as 
deterring consumers from patronizing the business. For instance, a 2001 
survey found that seventy-six percent of Americans would boycott a company 
known to have “negative corporate citizen practices.” Unethical behavior has 
other less obvious negative impacts on the bottom line as well. It can be 
harder to maintain and attract quality employees raising the cost of hiring 
and training new and potentially less qualified replacements. A company is 
also less likely to benefit from community goodwill which can translate into 
lost opportunities to gain “tax advantages, recruitment opportunities and 
strategic alliances.” Amie J. Devero, Corporate Values Aren’t Just Wall 
Posters—They’re Strategic Tools, AM. MGMT. ASS’N., 
http://www.thedeverogroup.com/graphics/articles/mworld%202-
edited_ama_%20logo.pdf.  
 129. Khanna, supra note 127, at 1495.  
 130. John T. Byam, Comment, The Economic Inefficiency of Corporate 
Criminal Liability, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 582, 586–87 (1982). 
 131. Moore, supra note 67, at 759. 
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for the acts of its agents even if the corporation did not know of, 
condone, or imply that the agent should commit the act. For 
these critics, aggregating a corporation’s culpability would have 
to include carefully considering whether upper management 
knew or aided an agent’s actions as a matter of corporate 
policy. Too often, these critics conclude, the acts of rogue 
employees acting contrary to corporate policy or where even 
careful oversight would not have detected the crime get 
unjustly imputed to the parent organization.132 This concern 
seems like a weak criticism in the case of major international 
violations. Major international criminal offenses like genocide, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity generally depend on 
an extensive array of activities. In such cases, wary corporate 
leadership likely would know (or ought to know) about the 
agent’s actions. 
Another argument brought by critics of holding 
corporations criminally liable is that prosecutors would abuse 
their power.133 Take, for example, the United States. Although 
prosecutors seldom indict corporations, critics proffer that in 
cases of corporate criminal allegations prosecutors regularly 
use their expansive powers to aggressively investigate the 
corporation and force it to make broad concessions. In exchange 
for the prosecutor deferring prosecutions, corporations 
regularly waive lawyer-client privilege, 134  force removal of 
senior management, 135  and stipulate to the facts as the 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. To demonstrate this criticism, consider Fischer Homes. In 2006 police 
conducted a large raid against Fischer Homes. The police seized thousands of 
pages of documents, made sure news cameras captured the entire sting 
operation, and eventually indicted seven employees on various criminal 
charges as well threatening Fischer Homes with a federal indictment for 
money laundering (a charge designed for use against organized crime, not a 
legitimate business). They gave the owner, Mr. Fischer two options. He could 
plead guilty and pay a $1 million fine or he could risk a conviction. The 
government also pressured the seven indicted employees to lie (i.e. to commit 
perjury). The employees refused and the charges were eventually dropped 
three years after the initial raid and more than a $1 million in legal fees later. 
In the end, it would have cost Fischer Homes less if it had simply acquiesced 
to the government’s demand to wrongfully admit its guilt. Jon Entine, A 
Parable of Politicized Prosecution, WASH. POST, July 21, 2009, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/07/20/AR2009072002355.html?hpid=opinionsbox1.  
 134. Mary Jo, White, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Has Gone 
Wrong?, 1517 PLI/CORP. 815, 820 (2005). 
 135. Id. at 821–22. 
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prosecutor sees them to be.136 Conversely, proponents of U.S. 
corporate criminal liability counter accusations of prosecutorial 
abuse by noting that corporations that have a satisfactory 
compliance and ethics program are much less likely to be 
prosecuted for the crimes of its employees. 137  Furthermore, 
while a concern in the United States, the situation above seems 
unlikely at the international level since an international 
prosecutor is unlikely to wield the coercive power a federal 
prosecutor has within the United States.138  
In short, critics have raised a plethora of concerns over 
criminal liability. These concerns possess varying levels of 
persuasiveness within a domestic context. However, when 
viewed through an international lens these critiques lose much 
of their vitality.  
B. A FORK IN THE ROAD: DOMESTIC TRIALS OR AN 
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL 
Thus far this Note has contemplated the various liability 
regimes the international community possesses to respond to 
international corporate criminality. It now turns to the 
mechanisms for carrying out those options. This section 
highlights the weaknesses of domestic courts and explains why 
the traditional limitations of international tribunals do not 
apply in the international corporate criminality context. 
A patchwork network of domestic courts adjudicating 
corporate human rights offenses poses several problems. Chief 
among them, few states have both the clout and the proclivity 
 
 136. Id. at 824. 
 137. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. 
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (protecting corporations from liability 
for sexual harassment suits because they had programs in place that the 
offending employee failed to utilize); see also Kolstad v. American Dental 
Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (stating that corporations will not be liable for 
managers’ discriminatory actions when they are contrary to the employer’s 
“good faith efforts to comply with Title VII”). 
 138. A careful reader might wonder why this point does not cut against the 
earlier argument in favor of criminal liability—i.e., that prosecutors will have 
the power of the state behind him. The key lies in balance. Many private 
attorneys in the developing world may not have the resources to face down a 
multinational corporation. On the other hand, some U.S. government 
attorneys have wielded corporate criminal liability like a bludgeon when a 
scalpel would do. In the middle, an international prosecutor would have 
greater resources than a developing world attorney, but less authority than a 
U.S. federal prosecutor. 
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to take up major corporate human rights offenses. 139  To 
illustrate the issue, consider Belgium. Around the millennium 
Belgian courts entertained a number of cases on the basis of a 
Belgium statute granting its courts universal jurisdiction.140 
However, in the face of repeated forceful warnings from the 
United States and Britain, Belgium quickly repealed its 
statute.141 Moreover, even if a domestic court has jurisdiction 
and renders a judgment, the court has no power to enforce its 
judgment abroad. 142  An international approach to corporate 
human rights abuse, on the other hand, would remedy these 
concerns since any such court would likely have a provision 
providing for enforcement of its judgments in the courts of 
signatory states.  
In contrast to domestic courts, the primary weaknesses 
attached to international human rights tribunals apply with 
less vigor within the context of multinational corporations. For 
instance, as noted above, international courts often fail to take 
sufficient account of local sentiment. For example, when South 
Africa conducted widespread truth and reconciliation 
commissions (TRC), having an international tribunal try key 
figures would have undermined the TRCs.143 Such meddling 
would have ignored local wishes, re-opened national wounds, 
and made future leaders less likely to give up power 
voluntarily. But offenses by multinational corporations seem 
unlikely to engender similar problems because prosecutions 
would occur against a multinational entity, rather than locals. 
That lack of proximity and local indictments combined with 
 
 139. See U.S. Reaction to Belgian Universal Jurisdiction Law, 97 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 984, 986–87 (2003) (noting that Belgium repealed its law providing for 
universal jurisdiction after pressure from the United States). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. This is particularly true for the courts of smaller countries because 
foreign judgments have no legal effect outside that jurisdiction. Hilton v. 
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895). In order for a party to enforce the court’s 
jurisdiction it must take that court’s judgment to a court with jurisdiction over 
the losing party and get it formally recognized. Such recognition, however, is 
not automatic. The recognizing court will look into the jurisdiction of the court 
that made the judgment, the finality of the judgment, as well as the fairness of 
the process and whether the foreign judgment violates its public policy. Yaad 
Rotem, International Law and the Economic Crisis: The Problem of Selective 
or Sporadic Recognition: A New Economic Rationale for the Law of Foreign 
Country Judgments, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 505, 507 (2010).  
 143. This is not to say that TRCs can never try local figures, in fact they 
have successfully have, but rather that in some cases a local touch works 
better than outsiders. 
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attempts to remedy harms wrought on the local population by 
outsiders would minimize the negative emotions of the harmed 
community and may actually ameliorate them.  
Likewise, local populations, if they notice the proceedings 
at all, often view international tribunals’ brand of justice as 
distinctly Western. 144  In the case of corporate offenses, 
however, the target audience is not the local population, but 
rather multinational corporations. An international trial in 
such a situation would not go unnoticed by the relevant actors. 
Nor would it generally be perceived as Occidental bias or 
victor’s justice since a large percentage of multinational 
corporations come from the developed world.  
Finally, international tribunals may actually have less 
reach than domestic fora. As products of international 
cooperation and compromise, international tribunals represent 
the least common denominator of human rights norms. That is, 
they are typically limited to only those rights the majority of 
the world could reach a consensus on.145 This limitation, if true, 
however, would not pose a problem for trying corporations 
engaged in war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide 
because either an amended ICC or a proposed special 
international tribunal would only pursue the most egregious 
violations by corporations. 
As opposed to its inadequacies, which apply less forcefully 
in the corporate context, international tribunals’ chief 
advantages remain potent. Such a tribunal’s existence would 
demonstrate a broad-based resolve to clean up and deter major 
corporate malfeasance. And although the actual results of such 
a body probably would not live up to its mandate due to 
technical and political issues, its existence and efforts would 
accomplish its main objective, raising expectations of 
appropriate corporate behavior. Moreover, having an 
international tribunal oversee prosecutions would also mitigate 
the competency and corruption problems engendered in having 
developing world courts handle the case. When a local court 
could not handle a case for competency or political reasons, an 
international court could step in. Likewise, if a domestic court 
adjudicated the matter, but the trial was a show or a sham, the 
international court could again provide a backstop to prevent 
 
 144. Sterio, supra note 79, at 378. 
 145. See Joyner, supra note 74, at 609 (stating that international tribunals 
often are influenced by the political considerations of permanent members on 
the Security Council thereby undermining their effectiveness). 
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injustice. Finally, an international tribunal armed with a 
charter granting evidentiary powers and enforcement 
obligations for signatory state courts would have a greater 
chance of doing justice. In such cases, the international 
tribunal would more likely uncover critical evidence and have 
its judgments enforced in the relevant court than the typical 
developing world court. 
C. SHARING THE LOAD: THE ICC FOR MAJOR VIOLATIONS, 
DOMESTIC COURTS FOR THE REST 
Domestic trials and international tribunals, as discussed in 
the previous section, have both strengths and weaknesses. 
Recognizing these competencies and limitations, the 
international community should develop a two-stream 
approach which parts based on the severity of the offense. For 
major offenses an international option should be on the table. 
However, for lesser conduct domestic proceedings are 
preferable.  
Grave offenses such as war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and genocide are less common and require a serious 
international response. Having the option—subject to 
complementarity—of conducting the trial before an 
international tribunal empowered to levy criminal sanctions 
makes more sense for several reasons. First, utilizing 
international tribunals would provide a clear statement that 
the international system has no tolerance for grave offenses. 
Second, given the politics involved when one nation or entity 
adjudicates the corporation of another country, an 
international tribunal is superior to a domestic court. For one, 
it is less likely to be swayed by the interests of powerful 
corporations or government interests. It might also act as a 
deterrent, encouraging states and courts to provide a 
reasonably fair domestic proceeding since a sham or show trial 
would not suffice to prevent an international tribunal such as 
the ICC from then hearing the case.146 Finally, an international 
tribunal would ameliorate jurisdiction and enforcement of 
judgment issues. To bring this concern into focus, consider a 
hypothetical proceeding against a security firm, Black H20, in a 
 
 146. That is, where a domestic court tries, but fails to fairly or sincerely 
adjudicate the crime, an international tribunal like the ICC would provide a 
backstop to re-try the case in a fair, impartial proceeding. Anne-Marie 
Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International Law is 
Domestic (or, The European Way of Law), 47 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 327, 341 (2006). 
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Swaziland court. Assume that Black H2O committed 
widespread atrocities in Swaziland but currently does not have 
any offices, men, money, or equipment in Swaziland. In such a 
case, Swaziland would have a hard time haling Black H20 into 
court. And, even if it granted a default judgment, the plaintiff 
could not recover the judgment in Swaziland because Black 
H2O does not have anything of value in Swaziland. The 
plaintiff would have to take the Swaziland judgment to a state 
that can enforce the judgment. However, enforcement is hardly 
guaranteed.147 An international tribunal with an enforcement 
provision, in contrast, would avoid these issues. 
On the other hand, for lesser offenses, the potential scope 
of claims makes an international tribunal impractical. 148 
Corporations conduct vast quantities of activities throughout 
the globe. 149  They want to keep costs low while many 
developing world governments want the foreign capital these 
corporations provide.150 A few bad actors multiplied by millions 
of corporate activities would extrapolate into an avalanche of 
claims that could potentially overwhelm an international 
tribunal like the ICC. Furthermore, hearing minor claims at a 
centrally located international tribunal would do a disservice to 
plaintiffs. Victims are often poor and uneducated. Witnesses 
tend to be similarly situated in these kinds of cases. To ask 
them to travel long distances for small claims would be 
impractical. 151  On the other hand, permitting them to file 
 
 147. See supra text accompanying note 138. 
 148. See Kritz, supra note 74, at 133 (explaining that despite the mountain 
of potential claims in places like the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as a 
matter of practicality and policy, the ICTY and the ICTR had to limit their 
prosecutions to a select few). 
 149. For instance, of the largest one hundred economies in the world, fifty-
one are corporations. Furthermore, the leading 500 multinational corporations 
conduct almost seventy percent of trade globally. World Trade Organization, 
Trade Liberalisation Statistics, http://www.gatt.org/trastat_e.html.  
 150. Manuel R. Agosin and Ricardo Mayer, Foreign Investment in 
Developing Countries: Does It Crowd in Domestic Investment?, UNCTAD 1 
(Feb. 2000) http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/dp_146.en.pdf (noting that 
developing countries prize foreign direct investment for a variety of reasons). 
 151. When the author says long distance, he makes one of two 
assumptions. Either the ICC would not find the claim worth setting up a court 
abroad to hear or that should it set up a court abroad, that the court would 
still be far from the typical third world resident. That may be because the 
claimant lives in the country while the tribunal sits in a city. It might also be 
because the ICC would likely not set up a tribune short of the existence of 
numerous claims. In such a situation, it would make sense logistically to 
locate the tribune in a centralized location, but that might also translate into 
many claims being too inconvenient to pursue no matter how meritorious.  
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claims in a local court improves their chances of having their 
day in court. 152  Additionally, trying lesser crimes at the 
international level might detract from the seriousness of war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide both by 
comparison and by clogging the litigation pipeline. 
III. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: CREATING 
INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION FOR CORPORATE 
ACTIVITY 
For the reasons mentioned above, an international 
corporate criminal liability (ICCL) scheme should be extended 
to corporations. This proposition raises the question: how to 
incorporate ICCL into the tapestry of international legal 
mechanisms. Though a full treatment of this subject is beyond 
the scope of this Note, this section will provide a brief outline of 
the two most promising approaches: (1) amending the Rome 
Statute to permit the ICC to hear such cases and (2) creating a 
new, specialized tribunal. 
A. AMENDING THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 
Extending the ICC’s jurisdiction to legal persons includes 
several major hurdles. The first and likely most important is 
that the United States is not a party to the Rome Statute. 
Given the sheer number of U.S. companies, this lacuna would 
significantly weaken any attempt to establish a single, 
international mechanism for handling international corporate 
human rights abuses. In addition, business entities would 
likely resist attempts to add legal persons under the ICC’s 
umbrella. Last, ICC members, like any highly varied group, 
have wide ranging views on the ICC that have already yielded 
at least one failed try to include legal persons under the ICC’s 
jurisdiction.153  
 
 152. Of course, this is not a perfect solution. Plaintiffs may be unable to file 
a civil claim either due to lack of money, education, or desire. Big corporations 
may strong-arm the process to get a desired result. But for small claims it 
simply is impractical to have an international tribunal given the number of 
potential claims and the international community’s likely reticence.  
 153. See Andrew Clapham, The Question of Jurisdiction Under 
International Criminal Law Over Legal Persons: Lessons from the Rome 
Conference on an International Criminal Court, in LIABILITY OF 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 144–46 (Menno 
T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000) (discussing the French 
government’s attempt to extend the ICC’s jurisdiction to organizations during 
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While significant, these obstacles are not necessarily 
insurmountable. Although the Rome Statute does not cover 
corporations, this omission appears to have resulted from 
procedural and definitional issues, not out of philosophical or 
legal objections to the ICC applying to corporations. 154  The 
disagreements during the statute’s drafting revolved around 
the intricacies involved in litigating legal persons via an 
international tribunal such as how to serve the indictment, who 
would represent the legal person, the level of intentionality the 
prosecutor must prove, and how to minimize a natural person’s 
ability to hide behind group responsibility.155 Moreover, what 
concern the delegates expressed about corporate criminal 
liability tended to focus on quasi-public corporate entities and 
non-governmental associations such as the Palestine Liberation 
Organization rather than the ramifications for private 
corporations.156 In addition to relatively mild opposition at the 
ICC’s drafting to include corporations under its jurisdiction, 
states have increasingly adopted the ICC and implemented its 
definitions. Indeed, a number of countries have gone so far as 
to permit charging corporations with international crimes.157 
Similarly, many states have adopted domestic corporate 
criminal liability schemes.158 These trends combined with the 
importance of resolving major international abuses by 
corporations suggest the potential (albeit a small one) for 
collective action.  
Assuming the international community manages to 
navigate these considerable political challenges, changes to the 
ICC’s underlying treaty language would need to occur. As 
currently written, Article 25(1) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court states that “the Court shall have 
jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Statute.”159 It 
does not discuss legal persons. However, adding the three 
words “and legal persons” to Article 25(1) would bring 
 
the negotiation stage of the Rome Statute). 
 154. Id. at 191. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. For an in-depth survey of legal remedies in sixteen countries from a 
cross section of regions and legal systems, see Anita Ramasastry & Robert C. 
Thompson, Commerce, Crime and Conflict: Legal Remedies for Private Sector 
Liability for Grave Breaches of International Law--Executive Summary (2006), 
available at http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/536/536.pdf. 
 158. See supra Section I.B.4.b. 
 159. Rome Statute, supra note 46, art. 25(1) (emphasis added). 
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corporations within the ICC’s ambit.160 
Along with amending Article 25(1) to include legal persons, 
the drafters would also have to include several other new 
provisions. For example, what actions could a court impute to 
the corporation? This Note proposes imposing corporate 
liability for an employee’s illegal acts (1) related to and 
committed within the course of employment, (2) committed in 
furtherance of the business of the corporation, and (3) 
authorized or acquiesced in by the corporation. 
Likewise, the ICC would have to establish a sentencing 
framework for determining the culpability of the corporation. 
At its most straightforward, the ICC could impose strict 
liability on the presumption that the corporation must have 
known of any offense grave enough to result in ICC 
adjudication. However, this Note proposes a more nuanced 
approach that considers three aggravating factors and two 
mitigating factors. Under this Note’s tentative suggestion the 
ICC would look at: (1) the involvement in or tolerance of 
criminal activity by “high level” or “substantial authority” 
personnel, (2) a recent history of similar misconduct on the 
organization’s part, and (3) whether the corporation tried to 
obstruct justice. Mitigating factors might include (1) the 
presence of an effective program to prevent and detect 
violations of law by corporate agents and (2) the extent of the 
corporation’s cooperation with law enforcement officials.  
In addition, the ICC would need to re-evaluate its 
penalties. Currently, the ICC has two choices: imprisonment 
and fines.161 Imprisonment may work if a corporate leader faces 
individual charges, but it does little to punish the actual 
corporation. Moreover, ICC reparations, while a promising 
penalty, would need reconsideration in light of corporations’ 
significantly greater resources. For example, a $2 million dollar 
judgment might harm an individual, but a multibillion dollar 
enterprise would barely notice. Consequently, penalties for 
legal persons should include the option of significantly stiffer 
monetary fines. 
 
 160. For example, it could read: the Court shall have jurisdiction over 
natural and legal persons pursuant to this Statute. 
 161. Rome Statute, supra note 46, art. 77. 
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B. A SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE 
LIABILITY 
If the signatories of the ICC cannot cooperate to amend the 
ICC, states could instead fashion a special tribunal. Past 
success at creating limited tribunals to adjudicate criminal 
prosecutions,162 human rights violations,163 and international 
business complaints164 suggests this as a potential solution. In 
order to develop a new tribunal for international human rights 
abuses by corporations, a coalition of states would need to write 
a charter document imposing the obligations and duties of 
multinational corporations. This Note suggests limiting the 
obligations to major offenses like war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and genocide as well as perhaps gross 
environmental damage. The document would then need to 
establish what constitutes a breach of each of those obligations 
and duties and lay down penalties for breaches. Penalties could 
include fines, depriving the corporation of the gains it received 
as a result of its illegal activities, suspending the corporation’s 
operations for a period of time, placing the corporation on 
probation, ordering the corporation to reorganize, or dissolving 
the corporation altogether. Following the creation of the 
substantive elements of the special tribunal, members would 
have to establish a procedural framework. Suggesting 
procedures goes beyond the conceit of this Note, but in 
determining the tribunal’s procedural aspects, drafters should 
draw from experiences with the multiplicity of special tribunals 
in other areas of international law. Finally, the charter would 
have to include enforcement mechanisms that would require 
the domestic courts of signatories to recognize and enforce the 
international court’s rulings. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Corporations conduct business on every continent in 
virtually every way. They own satellites that photograph the 
planet below as well and bounce cell phone and Internet signals 
 
 162. See GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, SURRENDERING TO 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS: CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURES 1 (2002) (discussing the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia). 
 163. For example, the European Court of Human Rights and Inter-
American Court of Human Rights.  
 164. For example, the General Agreement on Tariffs (GATT) and the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).  
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throughout the globe. They provide military resources via 
research and development, equipment, and manpower. They 
rummage throughout the planet acquiring oil, lumber, and a 
host of other natural resources. Most of these activities usually 
do not result in violations of human dignity, but where they do 
corporations should not escape liability simply because they are 
a legal person rather than a natural person or a nation-state.  
Just as corporate activity comes in many shapes and sizes 
so too should the response to corporate abuses. For lesser 
offenses, States should handle the aftermath through their 
legal systems. In such situations, States are best positioned to 
weigh the costs and benefits of assessing corporate criminal 
responsibility. Moreover, practicality dictates this approach 
since the international community has little stomach to 
develop, empower, and pay for a legal system sufficiently large 
to handle the array of claims that might result from hearing 
cases arising from nearly two hundred nations.  
In contrast, for larger offenses, particularly war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide, the international 
community should take a more active role. Large offenses call 
for a clear response from the world that the action is 
unacceptable and will not be tolerated. Given the necessity for 
an unambiguous response, the inadequacies of domestic legal 
systems and the advantages of an international tribunal, an 
international tribunal should oversee such adjudications.  
The form of law applied should also be tailored to the type 
of offense. For lesser offenses, civil liability should be the 
general rule. Smaller offenses are less deserving of the 
heightened opprobrium attached to criminal sanctions. 
Similarly, because the offenses are smaller and therefore less 
noteworthy, a government sympathetic to foreign investment 
may be inclined to ignore the matter. Civil liability enables a 
victim to pursue their claim independent of the government’s 
inclination. Furthermore, civil liability tends to impose a less 
strenuous burden of proof that aids victims in their quest for 
being made whole.  
On the other hand, for grave offenses an international 
tribunal should apply criminal law. In contrast to lesser 
offenses, major offenses such as war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and genocide are sobering accusations that require 
significant sanctions where appropriate. Criminal law best 
accomplishes these objectives by unambiguously expressing the 
gravity of the offense, demonstrating the international 
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community’s resolve, and ensuring maximum due process 
protection for the accused. In this way—permitting domestic 
courts to continue handling smaller human rights offenses 
while permitting, subject to complementarity, the trial of major 
corporate human rights offenses in an international tribunal—
the international system can accommodate recalcitrant states 
that do not support the ICC and other international 
adjudicatory bodies while better serving victims of gross 
corporate human rights abuse.  
 
